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THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE 
PART II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second in a series of articles examin-
ing the Rules of Evidence as they apply in criminal 
cases. 
RULE 201: JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Rule 201 is the only provision governing judicial 
notice in the Rules of Evidence. The rule is limited 
to judicial notice of adjudicative facts. According 
to the Staff Note, Rule 201 "in its entirety, reflects 
existing Ohio practice .... " This statement is 
somewhat misleading. Although numerous Ohio 
decisions fit comfortably within the framework of 
Rule 201, these cases do not distinguish between 
adjudicative and legislative facts as does Rule 201, 
nor is it clear that mandatory judicial notice of 
facts was recognized prior to the adoption of Rule 
201(D). In addition, the procedure for taking judi-
cial notice set forth in Rules 201(E) and (G) was 
not specified in the prior cases. 
Judicial Notice of Law 
Rule 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts. There is no provision governing judicial 
notice of law in the Rules of Evidence. Judicial 
notice of law is governed by Criminal Rule 27, 
which provides that the "judicial notice and deter-
mination of foreign law provisions of Civil Rule 
44.1 apply in criminal cases." Civil Rule 44.1(A) 
governs judicial notice of Ohio law, including mu-
nicipal ordinances and administrative regulations. 
See also R.C. 2941.12 (judicial notice of statutes in 
criminal cases). 
Adjudicative Facts 
Rule 201 is limited to judicial notice of adjudica-
tive facts. The term "adjudicative" fact is used in 
contradistinction to the term "legislative" fact. 
Both terms were coined by Professor Davis. See 
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
(1942); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 
945 (1955). Professor Davis described adjudicative 
facts as follows: 
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the 
immediate parties - who did what, where, when, how, 
and with what motive or intent - the court or agency 
is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts 
so determined are conveniently called adjudicative 
facts .... Stated in other terms, the adjudicative facts 
are those to which the law is applied in the process of 
adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to 
the jury in a jury case. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 
Colum. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955). 
For example, if an accused is charged with grand 
theft of an automobile, the prosecution is required 
to prove that the value of the automobile was 
$150.00 or more. See R.C. 2913.02(8). The value of 
the automobile is an adjudicative fact; it is a "fact 
of the case" that would normally be decided by a 
jury. 
In contrast to adjudicative facts (the facts of the 
case), legislative facts are those facts "which have 
relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking 
process, whether in the formulation of a legal prin-
ciple or ruling by a judge or court or in the enact-
ment of a legislative body." Advisory Committee 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 201. According to Professor 
Davis, when a court "develops law or policy, it is 
acting legislatively; the courts have created the 
common law through judicial legislation, and the 
facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judg-
ment are called legislative facts .... Legislative 
facts are those which help the tribunal to deter-
mine the content of law and policy and to exercise 
its judgment or discretion in determining what 
course of action to take." Davis, Judicial Notice, 
55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955). 
While the distinction between legislative and ad-
judicative facts may be clear in many cases, in 
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other cases the distinction is anything but clear. 
See 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 
405-15 (1977); 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure 474-81 (1977). 
Kinds of Facts Subject to Judicial Notice 
Rule -201(8) specifies two kinds of facts that are 
subject to judicial notice: (1) facts generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, 
and (2) facts capable of accurate and ready deter-
mination by resort to sources whose accuracy can-
not be reasonably questioned. These two catego-
ries of facts, however, are limited to facts that are 
"not subject to reasonable dispute." By limiting 
judicial notice to indisputable facts, Rule 201 has 
adopted the Morgan view of judicial notice. See 
Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269 
(1944). Two consequences follow from the adop-
tion of this theory of judicial notice. First, once a 
fact is judicially noticed by the court, evidence 
tending to establish or rebut that fact is inadmis-
sible. Second, the jury must accept the judicially 
noticed fact and is so instructed. There is, how-
ever, one deviation from the Morgan theory that is 
recognized by the rule. Rule 201(G) provides that in 
criminal cases the jury shall be instructed that 
they are not bound to accept a judicially noticed 
fact. 
Procedure for Taking Judicial Notice 
Rule 201(C) permits a court to take judicial no-
tice sua sponte, notwithstanding the absence of a 
request by either party. Rule 201(0) requires the 
court to take judicial notice if requested by one of 
the parties. If the fact is one capable of accurate 
and ready determination, the requesting party also 
must supply the court with sources whose accu-
racy cannot reasonably be questioned. The require-
ment of mandatory judicial notice upon request ap-
pears to represent a change in Ohio law. See 
Zimmerman v. Rockford Stone Co., 93 Ohio L. Abs. 
47, 49, 196 NE(2d) 474, 476 (C.P. 1963) ("The taking 
of judicial notice in situations such as this is dis-
cretionary with the court."). 
Rule 201(E) entitles a party, upon timely request, 
to an opportunity to be heard concerning both the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of 
the matter to be noticed. In situations in which a 
party has no advanced indication that judicial no-
tice will be taken, the party still is entitled to an 
opportunity to be heard even if the court has al-
ready judicially noticed the fact. The hearing 
should be held outside the hearing of the jury. See 
Rules 103(C) and 104(C). The provision requiring 
that a party be granted an opportunity to be heard 
is consitutionally mandated by due process~ In 
Garnert v. Louisiana, 368 US 157 (1961), the U.S. 
Supreme Court commented: 
[U]nless an accused is informed at the trial of the 
facts of which the court is taking judicial notice, not 
only does he not know upon what evidence he is be-
ing convicted, but, in addition, he is deprived of any 
opportunity to challenge the deductions drawn from 
such notice or to dispute the notoriety or truth of the 
facts allegedly relied upon. Moreover, there is no way 
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by which an appellate court may review the facts and 
law of a case and intelligently decide whether the 
findings of the lower court are supported by the evi-
dence where the evidence is unknown. Such an as-
sumption would be a denial of due process. /d. at 173. 
Rule 201(F) provides that judicial notice may be 
taken at any time of the proceedings. Thus, judi-
cial notice may be taken on appeal. The principal 
limitation on this use of judicial notice involves 
criminal cases in which no evidence on an ulti-
mate fact has been introduced at trial and the trial 
court has not judicially noticed that fact. The ap-
pellate court should not be permitted to supply the 
missing fact on appeal through the use of judicial 
notice. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 US 157, 173 
(1961) ("To extend the doctrine of judicial notice to 
the length pressed by the respondent would re-
quire us to allow the prosecution to do through 
argument to this Court what it is required by due 
process to do at the trial, and would be 'to turn the 
doctrine into a pretext for dispensing with a 
trial."'). In United States v. Jones, 580 F(2d) 219 
(6th Cir. 1978), the court commented: "Rule 201(g) 
plainly contemplates that the jury in a criminal 
case shall pass upon facts which are judicially no-
ticed. This it could not do if this notice were taken 
for the first time after it had been discharged and 
the case was on appeal." /d. at 224. 
Jury Instructions 
Rule 201(G) governs jury instructions of judi-
cially noticed facts. In criminal cases the court 
must instruct the jury that it "may, but is not re-
quired to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed." In effect, judicial notice operates as a 
permissive inference in this context. This provision 
was added by Congress. According to the House 
Judiciary Committee Report, a "mandatory instruc-
tion to a jury in criminal case to accept as conclu-
sive any fact judicially noticed is inappropriate be-
cause contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial." H.R.Rep.No. 93-650, 93d 
Gong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. 
Code Gong. & Ad. News 7075, 7080. See also State 
v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951). 
Although Rule 201(G) specifies that the jury is 
not bound to accept a judicially noticed fact, it 
leaves unanswered the question of whether evi-
dence contravening the fact noticed may be intro-
duced by a criminal defendant. See 21 C. Wright & 
K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure 534-35 
(1977). 
RULE 301: PRESUMPTIONS 
Rule 301 is the only provision governing pre-
sumptions in the Rules of Evidence. The rule cov-
ers only rebuttable presumptions in civil cases. 
There is no rule dealing with criminal presump-
tions. The U.S. Supreme Court proposed a rule on 
criminal presumptions (proposed Federal Rule 
303), but it was not enacted by Congress. See 56 
F.R.D. 212-14 (1973). Presumptions in criminal 
cases, however, are subject to review on constitu-
tional grounds. See County Court of Ulster v. Allen 
442 US 140 (1979); Barnes v. United States, 412 US 
837 (1973)~ C. McCormick, Evidence §§ 344, 346 (2d 
ed. 1972). 
RULE 401: RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." This definition 
embraces the concepts of relevancy and material-
ity. The phrase "fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action," however, is used in 
lieu of the phrase "material fact." Consequently, 
to be admissible evidence must be both relevant 
and material. 
Relevancy concerns the relationship between an 
item of evidence and the proposition for which it is 
offered to prove. In contrast, materiality concerns 
the relationship between the proposition for which 
the item of evidence is offered and the issues in 
the case. See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 185 (2d 
ed. 1972). For example, evidence of the results of a 
breathalyzer test tends to prove whether the per-
son tested was intoxicated. The test results are 
relevant to the proposition (intoxication). Evidence 
of intoxication, however, may not be material 
under the substantive law. If the results of a 
breathalyzer test ·were offered by a criminal de-
fendant as a defense in an aggravated vehicular 
homicide case (R.C. 2903.06), the evidence should 
~; be excluded as immaterial, even though the results 
of the test tend to prove intoxication. On the other 
hand, if the defendant were charged with ag-
gravated murder (R.C. 2903.01), the same evidence 
would be material because it tends to negate the 
element of prior calculation and design. See Long 
v. State, 109 OS 77, 141 NE 691 (1923). 
As noted above, Rule 401 defines relevant evi-
dence as "evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of [a material or consequential fact] 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." This definition is consistent 
with Barnett v. State, 104 OS 298, 135 NE 647 
(1922), in which the Ohio Supreme Court com-
mented: "Any fact that makes more probable or 
less probable, where the probabilities are in ques-
tion, renders such fact, relevant as evidence ... " 
ld. at 306 Accord, State v. Phipps, 3 App(2d) 226, 
210 NE(2d) 138 (1964), cert. denied, 382 US 957 
(1965). 
This standard does not require that the evidence 
make a material fact more probable than not, but 
only that the material fact be more probable with 
the evidence than without the evidence. For ex-
ample, in a homicide case the prosecution may 
Proffer evidence showing a motive on the part of 
the defendant. Such evidence does not establish 
that it is more probable than not that the defend-
ant committed the crime. The evidence, however, 
Would satisfy the standard of Rule 401; it is more 
Probable that the defendant committed the crime 
the evidence than without it This illustrates 
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the difference between sufficiency and admissibil-
ity. The evidence as a whole must be sufficient to 
permit the issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
Each item of evidence, however, need only ad-
vance the inquiry. 
RULE 402: ADMISSIBILITY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Rule 402 is the general provision governing the 
admissibility of evidence. Under that rule, relevant 
evidence is admissible in the absence of a rule of 
exclusion and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. 
Rules of exclusion may be based on a number of 
sources, including state and federal constitutional 
and statutory provisions, other rules of evidence, 
and other procedural rules prescribed by the Ohio 
Supreme Court. 
U.S. Constitution 
Many of the criminal procedure provisions of the 
federal Bill of Rights are protected by an exclu-
sionary rule, and consequently evidence obtained 
in violation of these constitutional provisions must 
be excluded in state trials. For example, evidence 
discovered or seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is subject to exclusion. See Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment). Simi-
larly, statements obtained from criminal defend-
ants in violation of the U.S. Constitution may be 
subject to exclusion. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
US 436 (1966) (self-incrimination clause); Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 US 387 (1977) (right to counsel). Evi-
dence of pretrial identifications obtained in viola-
tion of constitutional rights also may be excluded. 
See Moore v. Illinois, 434 US 220 (1977) (right to 
counsel); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 US 98 (1977) 
(due process). Moreover, the Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation may preclude the admission 
of evidence - principally hearsay. E.g., Barber v. 
Page, 390 US 719 (1968). 
Ohio Constitution 
The Constitution of Ohio contains a Bill of 
Rights, which includes many provisions analogous 
to the federal Bill of Rights. For example, Article I, 
section 10 provides for the right of confrontation, 
the right to compulsory process, and the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination. Similarly, 
section 14 of Article I prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
Although there is a substantial overlap between 
the federal and Ohio Bill of Rights, state courts 
may interpret state constitutions to provide greater 
protection to criminal defendants and thus exclude 
evidence that would be admissible in federal trials. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged this as-
pect of federalism on a number of occasions. See 
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 330 (1978); Lego v. 
Twomey, 404 US 477 (1978); Cooper v. California, 
386 US 58 (1967); Brennan, State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
489 (1977). 
For example, in State v. Gallagher, 38 OS(2d) 
291, 313 NE(2d) 396 (1974), the Court held that an 
in-custody parolee was entitled to Miranda warn-
ings before being questioned by his parole officer. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari but then 
remanded the case because it was "unable to de-
termine whether the Ohio Supreme Court rested its 
decision upon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, or 
Art. 1, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution, or both." 
Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 US 257, 259 (1976). On re-
mand, the Ohio Court reinstated its prior decision, 
stating that it was "independently constrained to 
the result we reached by ttie Ohio Constitution." 
State v. Gallagher, 46 OS(2d) 225, 228, 348 NE(2d) 
336, 338 (1976). 
State and Federal Statutes 
Rule 402 provides that relevant evidence may be 
excluded "by statute enacted by the General As-
sembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio .... " A number of provisions of the 
Revised Code exclude certain types of evidence or 
impose conditions on admissibility. E.g., R.C. 
2907.02 (evidence of sexual activity in rape prose-
cutions); R.C. 4511.19 (evidence of blood-alcohol 
content). These exclusionary statutes are control-
ling if "not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio." This provision of Rule 402 is based 
on Art.icle IV, § 5(8) of the Constitution of Ohio, 
which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate 
rules of practice and procedure that do "not 
abridge, enlarge, ·or modify any substantive rights." 
Although the phrase "Act of Congress," which 
appears in Federal Rule 402, was deleted from the 
Ohio rule, some federal statutes are intended to 
operate in state as well as federal court, and under 
the supremacy clause these provisions would pre-
empt contrary ~tate evidentiary law. For example, 
the federal wiretapping and eavesdropping statute 
provides: 
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been 
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communi-
cation and no evidence derived therefrom may be re-
ceived in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, 
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative commit-
tee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or 
a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that 
information would be in violation of this chapter. 18 
U.S.C. § 2515 (emphasis added). 
Other Rules of Evidence 
Relevant evidence also may be excluded by the 
operation of other rules of evidence. A number of 
exclusionary rules are found elsewhere in the 
Rules of Evidence. E.g., Rule 410 (certain types of 
pleas and offers to plead in criminal cases); Rule 
501 (privileges); Rule 802 (hearsay). Consequently, 
an item of evidence may meet the relevancy stand-
ard of Rule 401 and nevertheless be inadmissible 
because it fails to satisfy the requirements of 
some other provision of the Rules of Evidence. 
Other Court Rules 
Rule 402 also provides that relevant evidence 
may be inadmissible due to "other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio," which 
would include the Rules of Criminal and Juvenile 
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Procedure. For example, Criminc:ll HuJe 12.1 re-
quires notice of intent to offer evidence of alibi. 
The requirement imposed by this rule must be 
satisfied. 
RULE 403: EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
Rule 403 specifies the conditions under which a 
trial judge is required or permitted to exclude rele-
vant evidence. The application of Rule 403 requires 
a three-step process. First, the trial court must de-
termine the probative value of proffered evidence. 
Second, the court must identify the presence of 
the dangers enumerated in Rule 403(A) - unfair 
prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the 
jury; or the considerations enumerated in Rule 
403(8) - undue delay or the needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. Finally, the court must bal-
ance the probative value against the identified 
dangers or considerations. If the enumerated 
dangers substantially outweigh the probative value 
of the evidence, exclusion is mandatory· under 
Rule 403(A). If the enumerated considerations sub-
stantially outweigh probative value, exclusion is 
discretionary under Rule 403(8). 
Unfair Prejudice 
Rule 403(A) requires the exclusion of relevant 
evidence if the risk of unfair prejudice substan-
tially outweighs its probative value. In one sense, 
all evidence introduced by one party against an-
other is prejudicial to the latter's case in the sense 
that it damages that party's position at trial. This 
is not the concern of the rule. Only if the evidence 
is prejudicial in the sense that the jury cannot 
properly evaluate it, does Rule 403 come into play. 
Numerous Ohio cases have recognized unfair prej-
udice as a factor affecting admissibility. E.g., State 
v. Strodes, 48 OS(2d) 113, 116, 357 N E(2d) 375, 378 
(1976) (evidence admitted because its "probative 
value ... was not outweighed by the danger of 
prejudicial effect .... "); State v. Woodards, 6 
OS(2d) 14, 25, 215 NE(2d) 568, 577, cert. denied, 385 
u.s. 930 (1966). 
Confusion of Issues; Misleading the Jury 
Rule 403(A) requires the exclusion of evidence 
whose probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the dangers of confusion of issues or of mis-
leading the jury. These factors involve the "proba-
bility that the proof and the answering evidence 
that it provokes may create a side issue that will 
unduly distract the jury from the main issues." 
C. McCormick, Evidence 439 (2d ed. 1972). The 
Ohio cases have recognized confusion of the 
issues as a proper factor in considering the ad-
missibility of relevant evidence. See State v. Curry, 
43 OS(2d) 66, 330 NE(2d) 720 (1975); Cottman v. 
Federman Co., 71 App 89, 47 NE(2d) 1009 (1942). 
See a/so Whiteman v. State, 119 OS 285, 164 NE 51 
(1928) ("It is the province of the court to determine 
whether such testimony would be misleading ... ") 
(syllabus, para. 4). 
Discretionary Exclusion 
Rule 403(8) permits, but does not require, the 
trial court to exclude evidence whose probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the considera-
tions of undue delay or the needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. These factors involve "the 
likelihood that the evidence offered and the 
counter proof will consume an undue amount of 
time." C. McCormick, Evidence 439-440 (2d ed. 
1972). In contrast to the dangers enumerated in 
Rule 403(A), the factors of undue delay and the 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence are 
not intended to protect the integrity of the factfind-
ing process. They entail "no serious likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice ... " Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403, 51 F.R.O. 345 (1971) 
(revised draft). Instead these factors are designed 
to conserve judicial resources. 
The Ohio cases have recognized the trial judge's 
authority to exclude cumulative evidence. In Bird v. 
Young, 56 OS 210, 46 NE 819 (1897), the trial court 
limited the number of witnesses on an issue to six 
for each side, "refusing to listen to cumulative 
testimony on the same facts and questions by thir-
teen other persons." The Supreme Court held that 
"the matter is within the discretion of the trial 
court, and it does not appear affirmatively that the 
court abused its discretion in this ruling." /d. at 
223-224; accord, Borschewski v. State, 13 App. 362 
(1920). 
Limitations on the amount of evidence or the 
number of witnesses offered by an accused in a 
criminal case must also be evaluated in light of 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory 
process. In Washington v. Texas, 388 US 14 (1967), 
the Court commented: 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain 
terms the right to present a defense, the right to pre-
sent the defendant's version of the facts ... [The de-
fendant] has the right to present his own witnesses to 
establish a defense. This right is a fundamental ele-
ment of due process of law. /d. at 19. 
__ See also Ohio Const., art. I, § 10. Consequently, in 
criminal cases a trial court should exercise its dis-
cretion more cautiously when excluding evidence 
proffered by the accused. 
Balancing 
If the probative value of proffered evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair 
prejudice, or confusion of the issues, or of mis-
leading the jury, exclusion is mandatory under 
Rule 403(A). If the probative value of proffered evi-
dence is substantially outweighed by considera-
tions of undue delay or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence, exclusion is discretionary 
under Rule 403(8). The balancing recognized in 
Rule 403 is not new to Ohio law. In State v. Smith, 
50 App(2d) 183, 362 NE(2d) 1239 (1976), the court 
observed: "[E]vidence, though relevant, should be 
excluded when its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its admission will 
cause undue or unfair prejudice." /d. at 197. 
Application of Rule 403 requires the trial court to 
make a reasoned ad hoc judgment in the context 
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of a particular case. Although the rule requires a 
case-by-case analysis, several points deserve com-
ment. First, the rule manifests a definite bias in 
favor of admissibility; the dangers or considera-
tfons must substantially outweigh probative value 
before evidence should be excluded. Second, the 
federal drafters have indicated that other factors, 
such as limiting instructions and alternative 
means of proof, should play a part in the trial 
court's decision: "In reaching a decision whether 
to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consid-
eration should be given to the probable effective-
ness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruc-
tion .... The availability of other means of proof 
may also be an appropriate factor." Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403. "Other means of 
proof" includes stipulations. As one court has 
stated: "In achieving this balance [under Rule 403], 
the court has the power to require the government 
to accept a tendered stipulation in whole or in part 
as well as to permit it to reject the offer. to stipu-
late in its entirety." United States v. Grassi, 602 
F(2d) 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979). 
RULE 404: CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of 
character evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evi-
dence of a character trait to prove that a person 
acted in conformity with that trait on a particular 
occasion. The rule generally prohibits the circum-
stantial use of character evidence. Three excep-
tions are recognized; the exceptions relate to (1) a 
criminal defendant's character, (2) a victim's char-
acter, and (3) a witness' character. 
Character of the Accused 
An accused in a criminal case may offer evi-
dence of his character. Rule 405(A) limits the 
methods by which the accused may introduce 
character evidence; under that provision only opin-
ion and reputation evidence may be used, not spe-
cific instances of conduct. Moreover, in prosecu-
tions for rape and gross sexual imposition, R.C. 
2907.02(0) and R.C. 2907.05(0) control rather than 
the rule. 
The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) per-
mits the accused to introduce only evidence of a 
"pertinent trait of his character." In other words, 
the character trait must be relevant to the crime 
charged. For example, in Griffin v. State, 14 OS 55 
(1862), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he general 
character which is the proper subject of inquiry 
should also have reference to the nature of the 
charge against the defendant. Thus, in the present 
case, the defendant being charged with a crime 
necessarily importing dishonesty, called witnesses 
who gave evidence tending to show a general good 
character for honesty." /d. at 63. See also Sabo v. 
State, 119 OS 231, 239, 163 N E 28, 31 (1928). 
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a 
pertinent character trait, the prosecution may offer 
character evidence in rebuttal. The same limita-
tions that apply to character evidence offered by 
the defense apply to the prosecution. First, the 
character trait that is the subject of rebuttal must 
be "pertinent" to the crime charged. For example, 
in a theft case the defense character witnesses 
should only be allowed to testify concerning the 
defendant's character for honesty. Similarly, there-
buttal witnesses' testimony should be limited to 
the same trait, i.e., dishonesty. Second, Rule 405(A) 
controls the methods of proof which are available 
for the presentation of rebuttal evidence. Thus, the 
prosecution, like the accused, is limited to opinion 
or reputation evidence. 
R.C. 2945.56, which permitted the prosecution to 
rebut defense character evidence by introducing 
the defendant's prior convictions for crimes involv· 
ing moral turpitude, is superseded by Rule 405(A). 
Character of the Victim 
Rule 404(A)(2) permits an accused to present evi· 
dence of a pertinent character trait of the alleged 
victim of the charged offense. Once the accused 
has introduced such evidence, the prosecution 
may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution, how· 
ever, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the 
victim's character until the defense "opens the 
door." See State v. White, 15 OS(2d) 146, 150-51, 
239 NE(2d) 65, 69-70 (1968). Rule 405(A) limits the 
methods of proof that the accused and prosecu-
tion may use to show or to rebut the character of a 
victim; only reputation or opinion evidence is 
permitted. 
A victim's character may be relevant in two 
types of cases: on the issue of self-defense in 
homicide and assault cases and on the issue of 
consent in rape and gross sexual imposition 
cases. In the latter cases, R.C. 2907.02(0) and R.C. 
2907.05(0) control rather than the rule. Conse-
quently, Rule 404(A)(2) will be applicable princi-
pally on the issue of self-defense. For example, a 
homicide defendant could introduce evidence of 
the victim's violent and aggressive character to 
show that the victim was the first aggressor, 
thereby establishing one element of self-defense. 
Once evidence of the victim's character is intro-
duced by the accused, the prosecution may intro-
duce rebuttal evidence of the victim's character for 
peacefulness. 
The prosecution's right to introduce evidence of 
the victim's character, however, is not limited to 
cases in which the defendant introduces evidence 
of the victim's character. Any evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor in a homicide case 
triggers the prosecution's right to introduce evi· 
dence of the victim's peaceful character. 
Character of a Witness 
The third exception to the general prohibition 
against the use of character evidence concerns 
the character of witnesses. This exception, recog-
nized in Rule 404(A)(3), involves the impeachment 
use of character evidence and is therefore limited 
to the character trait oftruthfulness. Rule 404(A)(3) 
does not specify the conditions under which char· 
acter evidence may be used to impeach a witness. 
Instead, the rule contains a cross-reference to 
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Rules 607, 608 and 609 which govern the impeach-
ment use of character evidence. 
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
Rule 404(8) provides that evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts, although not admissible 
to prove character, may be admissible for some 
other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. For example, if 
a person steals a gun and later uses that weapon 
to commit a murder, the theft may be relevant in 
the homicide prosecution to show the identity of 
the murderer. Thus, although evidence of the theft 
incidentially evidences larcenous character, it is 
not being offered for that purpose. See State v. 
Watson, 28 OS(2d) 15, 275 NE(2d) 153 (1971). Rule 
404(8) supersedes R.C. 2945.59 ("similar acts" 
statute). 
Rule 404(8) only provides that evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible; the 
rule is not mandatory. The rule, however, provides 
no standard for deciding when such evidence may 
be admitted. Since admission in this instance in-
volves questions of relevance, Rules 401·403 are 
the controlling provisions. Rules 401-403, read in 
light of the prior Ohio cases, would seem to re-
quire that evidence of other acts is admissible 
only if the prosecution can establish that (1) the 
evidence is offered to prove a consequential or 
material fact; (2} such consequential or material 
fact is an actual issue in the case; (3) the evidence 
tends to prove the consequential fact, and (4) the 
danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 
RULE 405: METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER 
Rule 405 specifies the permissible methods of 
proving character. It governs how character may 
be proved but not when character may be proved. 
The latter issue is governed by Rule 404(A). That 
provision prohibits the circumstantial use of char-
acter unless one of the three enumerated excep-
tions discussed above is applicable. 
Reputation and Opinion Evidence 
Rule 405(A) permits the use of reputation evi-
dence to prove character. Reputation is not synon· 
ymous with character; it is only one method of 
proving character. The Ohio cases have recognized 
the use of reputation to prove character. See State 
v. Elliott, 25 OS(2d) 249, 267 NE (2d) 806 (1971), 
vacated on other grounds, 408 US 939 (1972); State 
v. Cochrane, 151 OS 128, 84 NE(2d) 742 (1949); 
4 Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.05 (1974 Provisional). 
The offering party must lay a proper foundation 
establishing the witness' qualifications to testify 
about a person's reputation in the community: 
"The preliminary qualifications of the [character] 
witness must be such as to advise the court and 
the jury that he has the means of knowing such 
general reputation of the [person] in the commu· 
nity ... "Radke v. State, 107 OS 399, 140 NE 586 
(1923) (syllabus, para. 1). In addition, the commu· 
nity may not be too "remote," i.e., in a place 
"where he has never lived, and where he is not 
shown to be generally known or acquainted ... " 
Griffin v. State, 14 OS 55 (1862) (syllabus, para. 5). 
· It is the accused's or victim's reputation at the 
.(I time of the charged offense that is relevant for this 
purpose. 
Rule 405(A) permits the use of opinion as well as 
reputation evidence to prove character if character 
is admissible under Rule 404(A). Thus, a witness 
who is sufficiently acquainted with the accused or 
the victim may give his opinion of that person's 
character. The Staff Note indicates that Rule 405 
"expands Ohio law by permitting the use of opinion 
evidence as to character .... At common law, proof 
of character was only by evidence of reputation." 
Specific Instances; Cross-Examination 
In addition to opinion and reputation evidence, 
character could be. proved by evidence of specific 
instances of conduct. Although evidence of spe-
cific instances of conduct may be the strongest 
evidence of character, Rule 405(A) prohibits its 
use. This follows prior Ohio law. See State v. 
Cochrane, 151 OS 128, 134, 84 NE(2d) 742, 745 
(1949); Hamilton v. State, 34 OS 82, 86 (1877); Grif-
fin v. State, 14 OS 55, 63 (1862). If character, 
however, is an element of a crime or defense, 
specific instances may be admitted under Rule 
405(8). Because few, if any, crimes or defenses in-
clude character as an element, Rule 405(8) rarely 
will be applicable in criminal cases. 
Rule 405(A) also provides that on "cross-
examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant spe-
cific instances of conduct." The purpose of this in-
quiry is to test the witness' qualifications for testi-
fying about another's reputation in the community. 
In State v. Elliott, 25 OS(2d) 249, 267 N E(2d) 806 
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 US 939 (1972) 
the Supreme Court commented: 
A character witness may be cross-examined as to the 
existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or asso-
ciations of the person concerning whom he has testi-
fied which are inconsistent with the reputation attrib-
uted to him by the witness - not to establish the 
truth of the facts, but to test the credibility of the wit-
ness, and to ascertain what weight or value is to be 
given his testimony. Such inconsistent testimony 
tends to show either that the witness is unfamiliar 
with the reputation concerning which he has testified, 
or that his standards of what constitutes good repute 
are unsound. /d. (syllabus, para. 2) 
RULE 406: HABIT EVIDENCE 
Rule 406 provides that evidence of the habit of a 
Person and the routine practice of an organization 
when offered to prove that a person or organiza-
tion acted in conformity with that habit or routine 
Practice on a particular occasion is admissible. 
The phrase "routine practice of an organization" 
refers to the "habits" of an organization, com-
monly known as business practice, usage or cus-
tom. The rule specifically provides that the admis-
sibility of evidence of habit does not depend on 
either the presence of eyewitness or corroboration. 
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Rule 406 provides only that evidence of habit or 
routine practice as proof of conduct is relevant. 
Consequently, Rules 402 and 403 also must be 
consulted to determine the admissibility of habit 
eVidence. 
Evidence of habit must be distinguished from 
evidence of character because the former is ad-
missible under Rule 406, whereas the latter gener-
ally is inadmissible under Rule 404(A). Rule 406, 
however, does not define habit. Nevertheless, the 
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 406 
quotes extensively from McCormick's description 
of habit and character: 
Character and habit are close akin. Character is a 
generalized description of one's disposition, or of 
one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as 
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. "Habit," in 
modern usage, both lay and psychological, is more 
specific. It describes one's regular response to a re-
peated specific situation. If we speak of character for 
care, we think of the person's tendency to act pru-
dently in all the varying situations of life, i·n business, 
family life, in handling automobiles and in walking 
across the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the 
person's regular practice of meeting a particular kind 
of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as 
the habit of going down a particular stairway two 
stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal for a left 
turn, or of alighting from railway cars while they are 
moving. The doing of the habitual acts may become 
semi-automatic. 
The key elements in determining whether con-
duct is habit are specificity, repetition, and the 
semi-automatic nature of the conduct. The factor 
of semi-automatic or nonvolitional conduct is illus-
trated by Levin v. United States, 338 F(2d) 265 (DC 
Cir 1964). In Levin the defendant offered evidence 
of his "habit" of observing the Sabbath in support 
of an alibi defense. The D.C. Circuit upheld the ex-
clusion of this evidence, stating, "It seems appar-
ent to us that an individual's religious practices 
would not be the type of activities which would 
lend themselves to the characterization of 'invari-
able regularity.' Certainly the very volitional basis 
of the activity raises serious questions as to its in-
variable nature, and hence its probative value." /d. 
at 272. 
In Walton v. Elftman, 64 Mise 45, 410 NE(2d) 
1282 (C.P. 1980), the court, citing Rule 406, ad-
mitted evidence of a person's "habit" of travelling 
home from work by a certain route. 
RULE 410: PLEAS AND OFFERS TO PLEAD GUILTY 
AND NO CONTEST 
Rule 410 governs the admissibility of evidence 
of (1) withdrawn pleas of guilty, (2) pleas of no con-
test, including equivalent pleas from another juris-
diction, (3) pleas of guilty in a violations bureau, 
(4) offers to plead guilty or no contest, and (5) 
statements made in connection and relevant to 
such pleas and offers. The rule provides that evi-
dence of all the above is inadmissible in both civil 
and criminal cases if offered against the person 
who made the offer, plea, or statement. This exclu-
sionary rule also covers the impeachment use of 
offers, pleas, and related statements. The rule, 
however, carves out an exception for perjury and 
false statement prosecutions. 
Withdrawn Guilty Pleas 
Rule 410 provides that withdrawn guilty pleas as 
well as statements made in connection with and 
relevant to such pleas are inadmissible. The Advis-
ory Committee Note to Federal Rule 410 sets forth 
two reasons for exclusion in this context. First, the 
Note cites Kercheval v. United States, 274 US 220 
(1927), for the proposition that admission of a with-
drawn guilty plea "would effectively set at naught 
the allowance of withdrawal and place the ac-
cused in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with the 
decision to award him a trial." Second, the Note 
cites People v. Spitaleri, 9 NY(2d) 168, 212 NYS(2d) 
53, 173 NE(2d) 35 (1961), for the proposition that 
admission of a withdrawn guilty plea would "com-
pel [the] defendant to take the stand by way of ex-
planation and to open the way for the prosecution 
to call the lawyer who had represented him at the 
time of entering the plea." See also State v. Gray, 
60 App 418, 399 NE(2d) 131 (1979). 
Pleas of No Contest 
Rule 410 provides that evidence of pleas of no 
contest or an equivalent plea from another jurisdic-
tion as well as statements made in connection 
with and relevant to such pleas are inadmissible. 
Criminal Rule 11(A) permits a criminal defendant to 
plead no contest with the consent of the court. 
The exclusion of evidence of pleas of no contest 
and related statements is necessary to preserve 
the distinction between pleas of no contest and 
pleas of guilty . .In this respect, Rule 410 follows 
Criminal Rule 11(8)(2) which provides: "The plea of 
no contest is not an admission of defendant's 
guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts 
alleged in the indictment, information, or com-
plaint and such plea or admission shall not be 
used against the defendant in any subsequent civil 
or criminal proceeding." Rule 410 goes beyond 
Criminal Rule 11(8)(2) by specifically excluding 
statements made in connection with and relevant 
to no contest pleas. 
Guilty Pleas in Violations Bureau 
Rule 410 provides that evidence of a guilty plea 
in a violations bureau and related statements are 
inadmissible if offered against the person who 
made the plea. Traffic Rule 13(A) establishes traf-
fic violation bureaus for all courts except juvenile 
courts. Traffic violation bureaus are authorized to 
dispose of all traffic offenses except for certain 
enumerated serious offenses. Traf. R. 13(8). Traffic 
Rule 13(0) specifies the procedures for pleas of 
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guilty. Rule 11 of the Rules of Superintendance for 
Municipal Courts and County Courts establishes 
violation bureaus for minor misdemeanors. Crimi-
nal Rule 4.1 prescribes the procedures for such 
c·ases. 
Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest 
Rule 410 provides that evidence of offers to 
plead guilty or no contest as well as statements 
made in connection with and relevant to such of-
fers are inadmissible. The exclusion of evidence of 
offers to plead guilty or no contest and related 
statements applies to all offers and statements 
made during an in-court inquiry into the providency 
of a guilty or no contest plea. Criminal Rule 
11 (C)-( E) establishes detailed procedures for deter-
mining the voluntariness of pleas of guilty or no 
contest. Under Rule 410 statements made during 
Rule 11 hearings are inadmissible if the plea is 
later withdrawn or rejected. This is consistent with 
Criminal Rule 11(G). Rule 410 goes beyond Crimi-
nal Rule 11(G) by specifically excluding statements 
as well as offers to plead guilty or no contest. 
In addition to in-court statements, Rule 410 
covers certain out-of-court offers and statements 
that are made in connection with and relevant to 
offers to plead guilty or no contest. This clearly 
covers offers and statements made during discus-
sions between defense attorneys and prosecutors. 
Several federal cases have read Rule 410 broadly 
to cover some "plea bargain" statements made 
during discussions between defendants and law 
enforcement officers. See United States v. Herman, 
544 F(2d) 791, 795-99 (5th Cir 1977); United States v. 
Brooks, 536 F(2d) 1137, 1138-39 (6th Cir 1976); 
United States v. Smith, 525 F(2d) 1017, 1020-22 
(10th Cir. 1975). In United States v. Robertson, 582 
F(2d) 1356 (5th Cir 1978) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit 
established the following test for determining 
whether statements fall within the exclusionary 
coverage of Federal Rule 410: 
The trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and 
determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an ac-
tual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the 
time of the discussion, and, second, whether the ac-
cused's expectation was reasonable given the totality 
of the objective circumstances. /d. at 1366. 
Certainly, the language of Rule 410 does not pre-
clude such an interpretation. Moreover, exclusion 
is required under Rule 410 notwithstanding the 
reading of Miranda warnings. These federal cases 
led to the amendment of Federal Rule 410. Federal 
Rule 410(4) now limits exclusion to "any statement 
made in the course of plea discussions with an at-
torney for the prosecuting authority which do not 
result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea 
of guilty later withdrawn." 
